The Favorite Betrayal criterion is a criterion for evaluating voting methods formulated by Mike Ossipoff. The criterion may be stated as, "There is no set of votes such that a given voter can improve (from his perspective) the outcome by raising his vote for someone over his favorite. "
Approval voting, Range voting, and Minimax (pairwise opposition) comply with the favorite betrayal criterion. Approval voting is a single-winner voting system used for Elections Each voter may vote for (approve of as many of the candidates as they wish Range voting (also called ratings summation, average voting, cardinal ratings, score voting, 0–99 voting, or the score Minimax is often considered to be the simplest of the Condorcet methods It is also known as the Simpson-Kramer method, and the successive reversal method The Borda count, Bucklin voting, Plurality voting, IRV, and all Condorcet methods fail. The Borda count is a single-winner election method in which voters rank candidates in order of preference Bucklin voting is the name of a Voting system that can be used for single-member and multi-member districts. The plurality voting system is a Single-winner voting system often used to elect executive officers or to elect members of a legislative assembly which is based on single-member Instant-runoff voting ( IRV) is a Voting system used for single-winner elections in which voters have one vote and rank Candidates in order of A Condorcet method is any single-winner election method that meets the Condorcet criterion, that is which always selects the Condorcet winner, the candidate
External links
- Survey of methods that avoid Favorite Betrayal
- Strategy Criteria by Mike Ossipoff
- Election Methods
- Survey of methods satisfying FBC
- FBC in relation to duopoly
- FBC used in mathematical proofs
- Commentary on FBC in relation to other voting methods
- Kevin Venzke's statement on FBC
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